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LITIGATING PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
Michele Estrin Gilman*
Presidential signing statements have been variously portrayed as much ado about
nothing,' a cause for concern,' and a constitutional crisis.3 Clearly in the latter
category, the American Bar Association (ABA) Task Force on Presidential Signing
Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine called presidential signing
statements "contrary to the rule of law and our constitutional system of separation of
powers."4 The ABA Task Force concluded that the President must veto legislation
he believes is constitutionally objectionable, rather than use presidential signing
statements to refuse to enforce statutes that he signs into law. In this view, such
refusals effectuate unconstitutional line-item vetoes.6 Accordingly, the ABA Task
Force urged Congress to enact legislation that would subject presidential signing
statements to judicial review in order to halt this presidential practice altogether.7
Senator Arlen Specter took up the ABA Task Force's suggestion and introduced
the Presidential Signing Statements Acts of 2006 and 2007,8 which would give
either the Senate or the House of Representatives standing to seek a declaratory
judgment about the legality of a presidential signing statement. It is easy to see why
some members of Congress want the judicial branch to referee this tug-of-war between
* Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore
School of Law. J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1993; B.A., Duke University,
1990. 1 would like to thank Professors Arnold Rochvarg and Kim Brown for their comments
on this Article, as well as the symposium participants. Stephen Mutschall provided valuable
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' Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive
Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 310 (2006) ("The attack on the institution of signing
statements is puzzling.").
2 Postings of David Barron et al., to Georgetown Law Faculty Blog, http://gulcfac.typepad
.com/georgetown.university-law/2006/07/thanks to-the-p.html (July 31, 2006) ("Briefly
summarized, we think nonenforcement on any seriously contested question of constitutional
law should be the rare exception, a rule of thumb that coincides with Executive practice prior
to this Administration.").
3 Am. BAR ASS'N, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinal-signing-statements-recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
4 Id. at 5.
1 Id. at 22.
6 Id. at 23.
7 Id. at 25.
8 S. 1747, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006).
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the executive and legislative branches. By pushing the issue to the judiciary, Congress
does not have to expend political capital in repeated showdowns with the President
over the scope of executive power. Moreover, once a clear-cut case involving exec-
utive inaction gets into federal court, the courts generally will order executive
officials to act in accordance with the law. 9 This Article explores whether Congress
can litigate presidential signing statements, concluding that they are not justiciable
even if Congress enacts a law granting itself standing. Furthermore, if the President
follows through on his signing statements and declines to enforce the laws as written,
those acts of presidential nonenforcement will face significant justiciability barriers.
As a result, Congress must use political tools to force the President's hand if the
President is refusing to enforce laws that he has signed.
Part I of the Article discusses the ripeness and standing barriers Congress would
face in seeking judicial review of presidential signing statements. Given these barriers,
Part 1I explores ways in which Congress can piggyback on hypothetical litigation
brought by private parties to challenge presidential signing statements, such as inter-
vention and amicus briefs. While these are viable methods to give Congress a voice
in this interbranch dispute, Part III discusses why such private lawsuits are unlikely
to succeed because of various hurdles to justiciability, including standing.
To illustrate these obstacles, Part III discusses six actual instances in which the
executive branch did not enforce statutes that President Bush had previously objected
to in signing statements. These acts of executive nonenforcement were uncovered
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) when it examined all of the presi-
dential signing statements that accompanied appropriations legislation in 2006.0
Part 1I also addresses threatened instances of nonenforcement contained in some of
President Bush's more high-profile signing statements, such as his objections to
statutes that require the head of the Federal Emergency and Management Agency
(FEMA) to be qualified, ban torture against foreign detainees, and set forth how the
United States should execute foreign policy in Sudan. This Part concludes that
plaintiffs would likely not be able to challenge actual or threatened acts of non-
enforcement because standing and other justiciability doctrines would pose
insurmountable barriers. In short, Congress will have to exercise its political powers
if it wishes to confront the President over his signing statements.
9 See generally Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An
Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (2003). Cheh explains that courts generally avoid ruling
on executive discretionary decisions but will order action where congressional intent is clear
and the institutional costs to the judiciary are low. See id. at 270-72.
10 U.S. Gov'T AccOuNTABLrrY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACTS 9-10 (2007) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf.
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I. BARRIERS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
In over 149 signing statements, President Bush has threatened executive non-
enforcement of at least 800 statutory provisions that he deems inconsistent with the
Constitution.1" His objections fall into four main categories. He objects to statutes
that he asserts (1) limit the President's power to supervise the unitary executive; (2)
impinge on the Commander-in-Chief powers; (3) violate the Presentment and
Bicameralism Clauses; and (4) violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.12 Commentators are mixed on the underlying merits of the President's claims, 3
although most conclude that he has issued presidential signing statements too rashly
and too often.14 Despite a general sense of outrage over the President's use of signing
statements, there has been scant attention given to the question of whether the issue
will come to a head in the courts. As this Part explains, congresspersons will face
serious ripeness and standing barriers if they hope to have the judiciary rule on the
merits of signing statements.
A. Ripeness
On their own, presidential signing statements do not have any tangible effect
other than putting us on notice that the President has constitutional concerns about
certain statutes. While we are officially on notice, we cannot be sure about much else.
For instance, many signing statements claim that the President will enforce the statute
at issue consistent with the Constitution, but they do not set forth the President's
specific views about constitutional interpretation.' 5 Similarly, other signing statements
claim that certain statutory provisions interfere with the President's power to
1' See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 3, at 14.
12 See Phillip J. Cooper, George W Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of
Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 522 (2005) (providing a
full list of George W. Bush's constitutional objections).
13 See, e.g., T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PRESI-
DENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITuTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 14-20
(2007) (concluding that President George W. Bush's signing statements in the areas of foreign
policy, executive privilege, and reporting requirements express an overly broad conception
of presidential power, but that his objections to legislative vetoes are supported by Supreme
Court precedent).
14 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 12, at530-31 (stating the Bush administration has employed
signing statements "so dramatically that it might surprise even Alexander Hamilton").
"5 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2005,
40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1453 (Aug. 5, 2004) ("The executive branch shall construe
these provisions relating to planning and making of budget recommendations in a manner
consistent with the President's constitutional authority to require the opinions of the heads
of departments and to recommend for congressional consideration such measures as the
President shall judge necessary and expedient.").
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supervise a "unitary executive; '16 however, they do not articulate a theory of the unitary
executive or reveal whether the President will ignore the statutory command.17 Thus,
the presidential signing statements do not cause any immediate injury other than
collective uncertainty over presidential intentions.
As a result, the signing statements are not ripe. Although the ABA Task Force
and Senator Specter are focused on granting Congress standing, 8 the foremost barrier
to hauling the President into court over a signing statement is ripeness. Whereas
standing determines who may bring a lawsuit, ripeness governs when lawsuits can
properly be heard. 9 The ripeness doctrine ensures that courts hear actual disputes
rather than speculative ones. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,20 the Court stated
that the ripeness doctrine is designed "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements" and
to limit judicial interference "until an administrative decision has been formalized
and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."'" A claim is ripe
if the issues are fit for review and there is hardship to the parties from withholding
review.22 A challenge to presidential signing statements seems to falter on both prongs.
An issue is considered fit for review when it is legal and final. The ABA Task
Force argues that the use of presidential signing statements poses a purely legal issue:
whether the President must veto legislation that he believes is unconstitutional.23
However, even if an issue is legal, it is not fit for review if it is better served by factual
development in a specific context.24 When the President issues a signing statement,
we do not know whether and how he will ultimately execute the statute underlying
the statement. We only know that he has some concerns that Congress may be
interfering with presidential prerogatives.
16 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1683 (Nov. 24, 2003) ("The executive branch shall
construe the restrictions on deployment and use of the Armed Forces in sections 541(a) and
1023 as advisory in nature, so that the provisions are consistent with the President's constitu-
tional authority as Commander in Chief and to supervise the unitary executive branch.").
" The "unitary executive" theory is associated with "the president's power to remove
subordinate policy-making officials at will, the president's power to direct the manner in which
subordinate officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the president's power to veto
or nullify such officials' exercises of discretionary power." Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G.
Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modem Era, 1945-2004,
90 IOWA L. REv. 601, 607 (2005).
18 See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
19 Standing and ripeness are closely related doctrines. See 13A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.12 (2d ed. 2007) ("Ripeness... easily
could be seen as the time dimension[] of standing.").
20 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
21 Id. at 148-49.
22 Id. at 149.
23 AM. BAR ASs'N, supra note 3, at 21-23.
24 See Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 734 (1988).
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Of over 800 presidential signing statements issued by President Bush, no one has
identified more than six that have not been enforced as written.25 The GAO un-
covered these acts of non-enforcement but could not conclude whether or not the
President's views are affecting how agencies are carrying out the law.26 Nor do we
know whether a similar pattern of non-enforcement is occurring in the absence of
signing statements. The GAO examined presidential signing statements that accomp-
anied appropriations acts in the fiscal year 2006.27 In eleven signing statements, the
President objected to 160 different statutory provisions. 28 The GAO selected
nineteen of those provisions to see whether the agencies charged with executing the
statutes carried them out.29 The GAO found that ten were executed as written, six
were not, and three were not triggered because they were conditioned on external
events that did not occur.30 These findings confirm that a signing statement is not
synonymous with final agency action. Thus, courts would likely be inclined to wait
to see how the executive branch chooses to implement a statute before ruling on the
validity of a signing statement. The President is using signing statements to protect
his prerogatives as part of an overarching strategy of expanding executive power;
31
however, he does not necessarily object to all of the substantive statutory goals or
plan to deviate from them.
Moreover, there are many steps between the President's issuance of a signing
statement and a specific agency's act of non-enforcement. 32 The President does not
carry out statutes; the federal bureaucracy does. A signing statement is not final; an
agency decision not to enforce is. 33 In Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, decided the
25 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 9.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1, 11.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
S' See generally Michael P. Allen, George W Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority:
The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 871, 871 (2007)
("It is no secret that the administration of President George W. Bush has consistently asserted
a breathtakingly broad view of the scope of executive authority under Article II of the United
States Constitution."); Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs
Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REv. 309, 312 (2006) ("Recent expansive assertions of implied
executive authority by the present administration against the backdrop of national security
considerations have also added a particularly combustible fuel to the controversy.").
32 In Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, the Court rejected as unripe a challenge to a
federal land and resource management plan adopted by the United States Forest Service
because the alleged harm was not imminent. 523 U.S. 726 (1988). "As we have pointed out,
before the Forest Service can permit logging, it must focus upon a particular site, propose a
specific harvesting method, prepare an environmental review, permit the public an oppor-
tunity to be heard, and (if challenged) justify the proposal in court." Id. at 734.
" In its report, the GAO was unable to conclude whether the presidential signing state-
ment impacted the agencies who failed to enforce the six statutes identified as not carried out
2007]
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same day as Abbott Laboratories, the Court held that a challenge to an FDA regu-
lation authorizing the agency to suspend certifications to manufacturers that denied
the agency free access to their factories was not ripe.34 The Court stated, "At this
juncture we have no idea whether or when such an inspection will be ordered and
what reasons the [FDA] Commissioner will give to justify his order. ' 35 Likewise, as
we have seen, the President may or may not follow through on the threats contained
in his signing statements.
Moreover, the executive branch may decline to enforce statutes with or without
a signing statement. Most statutes give the executive branch considerable room in
which to exercise its discretion. Congress does not legislate with specificity for a
variety of reasons. Some are legitimate, such as unforeseen circumstances, the com-
plexity of modem society, and the need for technical and scientific expertise in
policymaking, while some are less so, such as a lack of political will or failure to draft
with precision.36 Thus, Congress leaves it to the executive branch to fill in statutory
gaps. Many of these gaps are filled when agencies conduct notice and comment
rulemaking or adjudicate specific enforcement actions. 37 Throughout this process, the
President can influence how agencies carry out statutes in a variety of ways, ranging
from creating an annual budget to appointing sympathetic agency heads to conducting
regulatory review of proposed regulations.38 Given the inherent ambiguity in most
laws, different administrations often execute the same statute quite differently. 39 The
variation in administration priorities and tactics occurs irrespective of whether there is
a signing statement announcing such intent. In sum, it is how the executive implements
a statute that is potentially injurious, not the signing statement itself.
Further, signing statements do not cause hardship to Congress that warrants pre-
enforcement review. Hardship arises when parties are forced to comply with an illegal
as written. GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. This further suggests the difficulty of tying a
specific presidential signing statement to an agency's final action.
3 Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967).
i ld. at 163.
36 See RICHARDJ. PIERCEErAL, ADMINISTRATIVELAw AND PROCESS 43-44 (4th ed. 2004).
37 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553-54 (2000).
38 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 587-91 (1984).
" For example, the Reagan administration implemented a regulation forbidding family
planning clinics that receive federal funds from counseling patients about abortion. See
Separation of Abortion-Related Services from Family Planning Programs, 52 Fed. Reg. 33,
214-15 (Sept. 1, 1987). The Supreme Court upheld this "gag rule" against attack during the
Bush administration. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-79 (1991). President Clinton reversed
the "gag rule." See The Title X "Gag Rule", 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (Jan. 22, 1993). Subsequently,
President Bush reinstated part of it. Press Release, White House, Memorandum: Restoration
of the Mexico City Policy (Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/20010123-5.html.
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law or risk prosecution with substantial consequences. 4° For instance, in Abbott
Laboratories, drug companies were forced to choose between complying with a costly
FDA labeling requirement that they believed was illegal or risk criminal and civil
penalties for distributing misbranded drugs.4 1 In such circumstances, the Supreme
Court has stated that pre-enforcement review is appropriate." By contrast, no one
is forced to do anything or refrain from any action when a President issues a signing
statement. To be sure, Congress or private parties may be agitated as they await final
executive action, but this is not hardship. When the President issues a signing state-
ment announcing that part of a statute unconstitutionally infringes on presidential
powers, no one in Congress is forced to choose between forgoing lawful activity or
facing civil and criminal penalties. As for private parties, the Supreme Court has
held that, generally, non-enforcement of a statute presents less of a risk of injury
than enforcement.43
In many cases, President Bush has enforced statutes about which he expressed
misgivings in signing statements. In other situations, the executive branch appears
to have followed through on the President's threats of non-enforcement. When there
is an actual agency decision not to enforce, the ripeness barrier falls away. At that
point, the timing is right. Yet, a litigant must show not only that the time is right for
judicial review, but also that he or she has suffered an injury for standing purposes.
Although it is impossible to assess the risks posed by non-enforcement of 800 different
statutory provisions, it is significant that no one has yet emerged from the wood-
work claiming individual harm. The injuries identified by the ABA and other
commentators go to the structural balance of our system of separation of powers. This
view of presidential power may be significant, even dangerous, but signing state-
ments have yet proven to impact anyone individually. As the next Part explains,
members of Congress might be angry over a signing statement, but the Supreme
Court has held that congressional displeasure is not an injury.
B. Legislator Standing
Under Article 111 of the Constitution, courts can only adjudicate cases and
controversies." Standing is one element of the case and controversy requirement. To
establish standing, the "plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
4 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
4I ld. at 152-54.
42 Id.
41 See Cheh, supra note 9, at 279-85 (explaining that under Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821 (1985), executive refusals to enforce the law are presumptively unreviewable). Cheh
critiques the Chaney presumption, stating that "the distinction between action and nonaction,
with action alone raising concern about the rights of individuals, completely ignores the public
rights created by statutory regimes." Id. at 281.
44 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
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defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested
relief."45 The requirement of injury-in-fact is the insurmountable hurdle for most
legislator lawsuits; cases in this area do not even get to the traceability and redress-
ability standing requirements. 46 To demonstrate an injury, the plaintiff must allege that
he has a personal and particularized stake in the dispute and that he has "suffered...
an invasion of a legally protected interest.
47
In Raines v. Byrd,48 the Supreme Court set forth a narrow conception of legislator
standing that overturned a line of D.C. Circuit cases that typically granted legislators
standing, while denying them review on the merits through court-created "equitable
discretion" doctrines.49 In Raines, the Court held that individual legislators lacked
standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, which gave the President the authority
to cancel spending and tax benefit measures after he signed them into law, subject
to congressional overruling.50 The Court began its opinion by noting that respect for
separation of powers principles requires a rigorous standing inquiry when the case
involves political branch disputes." In so doing, the Court glossed over a provision
of the Act that expressly gave the federal courts jurisdiction to rule on the Act's
constitutionality even before the President flexed his veto power.52 Instead, the Court
reasoned that the claimed injury to the plaintiffs, six current and former congress-
persons, was solely institutional and thus "wholly abstract and widely dispersed.
5 3
The Court contrasted the alleged injury in Raines to the two types of cases in which
legislators do have standing. 4
4' Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984).
46 As noted earlier, standing and ripeness doctrines are related. If critical events have not
yet occurred, there can be said to be no redressable injury and likewise, the claim is not ripe.
See 13AWRIGHT ETAL., supra note 19, at § 3531.12.
4" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
48 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
49 For an extended discussion of D.C. Circuit approaches to legislator standing prior to
Raines, see Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The
Past, Present, and Future ofLegislator Standing, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 209,222-41
(2001), and Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as
Counterweight? 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 63, 73-103 (1992).
50 Raines, 521 U.S. at 830.
"' Id. at 819-20. Neal Devins and Michael A. Fitts argue that "the Court's character-
ization of congressional standing as an invitation to interbranch Armageddon is, at the very
least, unnecessary." Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd
and the Modern Supreme Court'sAttemptto Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO.
L.J. 351,354 (1997). The authors contend that the Court was wise to avoid rendering an opinion
before the effects of the Line Item Veto Act were known, but that the Court should do more to
urge Congress to pass judgment on the constitutionality of its enactments. Id. at 360-61.
52 Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3.
53 Id. at 829.
54 Id. at 821.
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First, legislators have standing where they suffer an individual injury.55 Thus,
in Powell v. McCormack, a congressman had standing to challenge his exclusion
from the House of Representatives and his consequent loss of salary.56 Whereas the
Powell plaintiff suffered a personal injury, the legislators in Raines suffered a claimed
injury which "runs... with the Member's seat" and not as a "prerogative of personal
power. 57 Indeed, every member of Congress in Raines suffered the same alleged loss
of political power as a result of the Line Item Veto Act.
Second, legislators can suffer a legally cognizable institutional injury, but only
when their votes are nullified. Coleman v. Miller 8 established this proposition in 1939.
There, twenty Kansas state senators alleged that the Lieutenant Governor cast an
unlawful tie-breaking vote in the state senate in favor of a federal constitutional
amendment, thereby approving the amendment against their votes.59 The Court held
that the losing senators had a "plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of their votes." 6 As the Raines Court explained, Coleman stands for
the proposition that legislators are institutionally injured only if their votes are
completely nullified, that is, if their "votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or
enact) a specific legislative Act" but "that legislative action goes into effect (or does
not go into effect)."6' The Raines legislators did not have their votes nullified, because
their votes were given full effect. "They simply lost that vote. 62 Moreover, the
legislators had remedies for their discontent-they could repeal the Act or exempt
certain appropriations bills from the Act's reach.63 The Line Item Veto Act also
remained open to challenge by someone suffering a true injury-in-fact, which is exactly
what eventually happened when the Act was stricken down as unconstitutional in
Clinton v. City of New York. 64
55 Id.
56 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
17 Raines, 521 U.S. at 821.
58 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 438.
61 Raines, 521 U.S. at 823.
62 Id. at 824.
63 id.
6 Clinton v. New York consolidated two cases: The plaintiffs in the first case [were] the
City of New York, two hospital associations, one hospital, and two unions representing health
care employees. The plaintiffs in the second [case were] a farmers' cooperative consisting
of about thirty potato growers in Idaho and an individual farmer who was a member and
officer of the cooperative. 524 U.S. 417,425 (1998). They all faced adverse financial conse-
quences as a result of the President exercising the Line Item Veto by canceling section 4722(c)
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which waived the Federal Government's statutory right
to recoupment of as much as $2.6 billion in taxes that the State of New York had levied
against Medicaid providers, and section 968 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, which
permitted the owners of certain food refiners and processors to defer recognition of capital
gains if they sold their stock to eligible farmers' cooperatives. Id. at 432-37.
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Raines was a very narrow decision.65 Since Raines, the D.C. Circuit has shed
further light on what constitutes "nullification."' In Chenoweth v. Clinton,67 members
of Congress sued the President, challenging his issuance of an executive order that
provided federal support for local efforts to preserve historically significant rivers.68
The plaintiffs claimed that the Executive Order bypassed the legislative process and
thereby "diminished their power as Members of the Congress." 69 The court held that
the plaintiffs lacked standing because their claimed injury-the dilution of their
authority as legislators-was the same as that rejected in Raines.7 ° The court stated
that the dispute was "fully susceptible to political resolution," because Congress could
overturn the effect of the Executive Order by passing a law to the contrary. 7' The
court left the door open for legislator standing where the President's action prevents
a bill from becoming law.72
The court seemingly shut that door in Campbell v. Clinton.73 There, several con-
gressmen sued President Clinton, seeking a declaratory judgment that the President
violated the War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of the Constitution
when he directed the United States forces' participation in a NATO campaign in
Yugoslavia.74 Again, the D.C. Circuit held that the legislators lacked standing.75
The court reasoned that in Coleman nullification involved a defeated constitutional
ratification that was treated as approved.76 By contrast, in Campbell, the President
was not "acting pursuant to the defeated declaration of war or a statutory authorization,"
but rather pursuant to his constitutional foreign affairs powers and as Commander in
Chief.77 Thus, nothing that Congress did was nullified.78 According to the court,
Coleman and Raines do not support the proposition that a legislator has standing
"whenever the government does something Congress voted against... [or] anytime
65 See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 50, at 260, 273; Devins & Fitts, supra note 52, at
374-75.
' Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 50, at 273.
67 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 113.
70 Id. at 117.
71 Id. at 116.
72 ld. at 116-17. The court distinguished Kennedy v. Sampson, in which it had granted
legislator standing to challenge presidential use of the pocket veto on the grounds that a
pocket veto "could plausibly" be described as a nullification. Id. at 116-17 (citing Kennedy
v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
73 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000).
74 Id. at 20.
71 Id. at 20, 24.
76 Id. at 22.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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a President allegedly acts in excess of statutory authority."7 9 Instead, the Supreme
Court recognized in Coleman "that a ratification vote on a constitutional amendment
is an unusual situation."8 Once the amendment in Coleman was deemed ratified, the
senators were powerless to rescind it.8 Conversely, in Campbell, the plaintiffs
could have stopped the United States' involvement in Yugoslavia by passing a law
forbidding the use of American forces or cutting off funds for the military. 2 Yet, as
the court noted, congressional efforts on both of those fronts fizzled.83 In addition,
the court stated that Congress can impeach a President who acts in blatant disregard
of Congress's authority.' 4 In short, the D.C. Circuit has sent a loud message that
legislators should be required to turn to politics instead of the courts when they are
unhappy with the President.85
Does a presidential signing statement constitute a nullification? Under existing
precedent, the answer is clearly no. The ABA Task Force defines the injury to
Congress as "the usurpation of the lawmaking powers of Congress by virtue of the
provisions of the signing statement, and the denial of the opportunity to override a
veto., 86 Here, the argument goes, congresspersons cast their votes, there is no veto,
the law is on the books, and yet no one will benefit from the law. In Coleman terms,
the legislators' votes were sufficient to enact a law, but that legislative action does not
go into effect. Yet, unlike in Coleman, the law is still on the books, and the President
may decide to enforce it. The signing statements themselves do not cause injury-what
may be objectionable is the action (or lack of action) the President ultimately decides
to take in carrying out a statute. 7 Indeed, President Bush has enforced many statutes
despite issuing signing statements that threaten otherwise.88 Moreover, future
Presidents may enforce any law once it is on the books.
Further, members of Congress retain a variety of political alternatives to achieve
statutory objectives. Congress's formal powers include the threat of impeachment
and the power of the purse.89 Since the other branches of government depend on
79 id.
80 Id.
1 Id. at 23.
82 Id.
83 Id.
8 id.
85 Id. at 24. In his concurrence, Judge Randolph asserted that the majority's emphasis on
alternative political remedies "is tantamount to a decision abolishing legislative standing."
Id. at 32 (Randolph, J., concurring). The majority responded that political self-help was
integral to the Raines decision. Id. at 24 (majority opinion).
86 AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 3, at 26.
87 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 1, at 310 (stating that many commentators are
missing the point that "the real concern is not with the institution of signing statements but
with the Bush administration's underlying views of executive power").
88 See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 1.
89 See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 61,
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Congress for their funding, Congress's budgetary power "is among Congress's
most potent weapons in its effort to control the execution of the laws."90 Congress's
methods of informal supervision over executive agencies include "cajoling, adverse
publicity, audits, investigations, committee hearings, factfinding missions, informal
contacts with agency members and staff, and pressure on the President to appoint
persons chosen by members of Congress to agency positions." 91 These informal
controls operate against a background threat that noncompliant federal agencies may
find their budgets cut or their programs eliminated. 92 For these same reasons, even
if the President follows up on his threats and refuses to enforce a statute, there is no
nullification under current precedent. In the event of statutory non-enforcement,
congresspersons not only retain political remedies, but private parties may also be able
to bring suit if they can allege injury-in-fact.
Still, Raines does not address whether Congress as a body has a greater claim to
standing than individual legislators. Raines dealt with individual legislators as
plaintiffs, rather than houses of Congress, and suggested that distinction could be
significant.93 In so doing, the Court cited two cases stating that the houses of
Congress have aggregate institutional interests separate from their members. 94 Yet
if nullification is truly the test for standing, it seems the result would be the same
regardless of whether the plaintiff is an individual legislator or a house of Congress.95
By emphasizing the extreme alternative of impeachment, the Supreme Court and the
D.C. Circuit have suggested that nullification rarely occurs.
69-70 (2006).
90 Id. at 84.
9 Id. at 70.
92 Id. at 121-22. Nevertheless, Congress may still need the courts to play an important
role in reigning in executive excess, because Congress cannot always "police nonenforce-
ment alone." Cheh, supra note 9, at 286-87. The standing cases ignore this reality.
" "We attach some importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized to
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both Houses actively
oppose their suit." Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997). The Senate and the House
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (consisting of the Speaker, the Majority Leader, the
Minority Leader, and the two Whips) filed a joint amicus curiae brief arguing for reversal
of the district court opinion striking down the Line Item Veto Act as unconstitutional. Id. at
818 n.2. The houses of Congress did not weigh in on the standing issue. Id.
94 Id. at 829 n. 10 ("Generally speaking, members of collegial bodies do not have standing
to perfect an appeal the body itself has declined to take."(quoting Bender v. Williamsport
Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 544 (1986)); "The two houses of Congress are legislative
bodies representing larger constituencies. Power is not vested in any one individual, but in
the aggregate of the members who compose the body, and its action is not the action of any
separate member or number of members, but the action of the body as a whole." (quoting
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 7 (1892))).
9' See infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text discussing Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 313
F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2002).
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The arguments in favor of congressional standing are that judicial abdication
leads to executive aggrandizement of power and allows the political branches to
amend the Constitution without following Article V requirements.96 The argument
against congressional standing is that the federal courts should hear cases involving
private injuries and refrain from umpiring disputes between the political branches
of the government because those branches have powers that private parties do not.97
Moreover, in this view, judicial power is expanded when the courts freely allow
standing, which in turn gives too much power to an undemocratic branch and under-
mines judicial legitimacy.98 In the pro-standing view, separation of powers requires
court involvement, while in the anti-standing view, separation of powers requires
court abstention. Thus, the Supreme Court's resolution of this issue would likely
hinge on its view of separation of powers, i.e., whether separation of powers is best
preserved when the Court adjusts for imbalance or when the Court allows imbal-
ances to work themselves out over time.
Clearly, the best odds for Congress to challenge executive action on the merits
are situations in which individual interests are impacted. Yet if private parties are
injured, the Court would expect them to file suit as plaintiffs, in which case the role
of Congress would be secondary, perhaps as an intervenor or amicus. Accordingly,
the next Part addresses Congress's ability to participate in ongoing litigation over
executive non-enforcement.
II. INTERVENTION AND AMICUS
Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit have rejected expansive notions
of legislator standing, preferring instead to consider alleged executive branch violations
of law in the context of lawsuits brought by private parties. These private lawsuits
could provide members of Congress with the means for making their views about
the merits of a case known to the court. By piggybacking on a private lawsuit as
either intervenors or amici curiae, congresspersons could align themselves with private
parties challenging presidential acts of non-enforcement. An intervenor joins an
ongoing lawsuit and has the same rights as the original parties, such as the right to
argue before the court.99 By contrast, an amicus provides the court with information
and typically does not have other participatory rights. As this Part explains, congress-
persons are freely allowed to participate as amicus, while intervention rights are less
of a guarantee.
96 See Meyer, supra note 50, at 67-72.
9' See Arend & Lotrionte, supra note 50, at 273-79.
98 See Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); see also Vander Jagt v. O'Neill,
699 F.2d 1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983).
99 7C WRIGHTETAL., supra note 19, at §§ 1901, 1920.
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A. Congressional Intervention
Intervention is a procedural tool that allows a non-party whose interests are
impacted by litigation to join an ongoing lawsuit." Once admitted, an intervenor
has all the rights and obligations as the original parties to the litigation and is
likewise bound by the judgment in the case.'0 1 Intervention is automatically allowed
if a federal statute confers an unconditional right to intervene. 2 The most important
federal statute granting such a right is 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a), which permits the
United States to intervene in any federal court litigation challenging the constitution-
ality of an act of Congress that affects the public interest if neither the United States
nor any officer, agency, or employee thereof, is a party. 10 3 The court and the parties
must notify the Attorney General about the lawsuit and allow the United States to
present evidence and argument about the constitutional issue."
This statute, however, is of limited use to the houses of Congress or their members
if they disagree with the executive branch about the constitutionality of a law, because
the statute envisions that the executive branch will defend the challenged law. The
official role of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice is to represent
the United States in litigation and to coordinate litigation across the many agencies
that make up the executive branch.'05 In general, once the Attorney General decides
whether or not to join the litigation, the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) does not
allow additional components of the United States government to join the case, such
as federal agencies or members of Congress.
Congress has filled this gap by granting the Senate the right to intervene (or
appear as amicus curiae) in litigation "in which the powers and responsibilities of
Congress under the Constitution of the United States are placed in issue," as long as
"standing to intervene exists under section 2 of article ImI of the Constitution of the
United States."" By statute, Congress created the Office of Senate Legal Counsel,
which is headed by a Senate Legal Counsel (SLC) who is appointed by the President
pro tempore of the Senate based on recommendations from the Senate majority and
minority leaders.0 7 The SLC can seek intervention only upon a resolution passed
100 Id. § 1901.
1o1 Id. § 1920.
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). This is called intervention of right. There is also permissive inter-
vention at the discretion of the court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).
103 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2000).
104 Id.
'05 See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2000) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested,
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General.").
" 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2000).
107 Id. § 288(a).
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by the Senate. 10 8 The Attorney General must notify the SLC when the executive
branch will not enforce, apply, or administer a federal law on the ground that it is
unconstitutional, or decides not to defend a law against constitutional attack., °9 As
an intervenor, the SLC is expected to "defend vigorously" when there is a challenge
to Congress's power to make laws or to the constitutionality of laws.1 ° The statu-
tory requirement that the Senate satisfy Article II standing requirements in order to
intervene could be a significant constraint in light of Raines and its progeny in the
D.C. Circuit.
Nevertheless, although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find legislator
standing, it has been liberal in allowing legislators to intervene where houses of
Congress or members of Congress are defending a statute against constitutional
attack."' For instance, both houses of Congress intervened in INS v. Chadha to
defend the constitutionality of a portion of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
that allowed a one-house veto over an executive decision to allow a particular deport-
able alien to remain in the United States. 12 The executive branch sided with the
plaintiff in attacking the provision as an unconstitutional legislative veto, and the
Court agreed. 13 In approving of congressional intervention in the case, the Court
stated, "We have long held that Congress is the proper party to defend the validity
of a statute when an agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing
the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional."
'' 14
The Court did not cite any statute or rule in support of this proposition, instead cited
two older cases in which the Senate appeared only as amicus curiae." 5
Yet the Court's impetus to hear Congress's voice in the dispute over the legality
of the legislative veto seems correct, despite the lack of express authority for the
108 Id. § 288b(c). The SLC also has many other legal duties, such as enforcing subpoenas,
defending the Senate against suits brought by members of Congress or congressional em-
ployees, and providing litigation support for congressional investigations. Id. §§ 288(a)-288(n).
For a full description of the litigation duties undertaken by the Senate and House counsels,
see Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court
the Institutional Congressional Client, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 47.
'09 2 U.S.C. § 288k(b) (Supp. III 2003); 28 U.S.C. § 530D (Supp. II 2002).
"0 2 U.S.C. § 288(h) (2000).
"'. One author contends that it is unconstitutional for Congress to litigate in defense of a
statute because it violates the separation of powers for Congress to delegate the power to
execute the law to itself. James W. Cobb, Note, By "Complicated and Indirect" Means:
Congressional Defense of Statutes and the Separation of Powers, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
205 (2004).
112 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Both houses of Congress intervened before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Id. at 930 n.5.
"' Id. at 959.
114 Id. at 940.
"' Id. (citing Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 210 n.9 (1968); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946)).
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proposition. The participation of Congress in an interbranch dispute over a separation
of powers issue ensures that the issue will be adequately aired and briefed, especially
if there is no other entity defending the merits of the statute, as occurred in Chadha.I,
6
Further, in Chadha, denying congressional intervention would have resulted in the
case being dismissed and Mr. Chadha being deported-even though he was correct
on the merits-because there would not have been an adversary party defending the
statute." 7 Without congressional intervention, there are circumstances, such as those
in Chadha, in which the President could essentially veto a law simply by failing to
defend it.
Of course, this is the same claim made by opponents of presidential signing state-
ments, who believe they are illegal after-the-fact vetoes. Yet the Supreme Court has
indicated that the availability of other political remedies would defeat congressional
standing to challenge a presidential signing statement. If "Congress's legislative,
impeachment and oversight powers""' 8 are sufficient to defeat standing, why were
they not sufficient to defeat intervention in Chadha? To begin with, both houses of
Congress intervened in Chadha, "9 as opposed to individual legislators. 20 This allowed
Congress to speak with a single, authoritative voice, a factor that was missing in Raines.
More importantly, in Chadha, there was a private plaintiff who clearly suffered
an injury, namely, the threat of deportation.' 2 ' In turn, this assured that the dispute
had the necessary level of concreteness and factual development for judicial review.122
Thus, Congress was joining an already existing lawsuit, rather than using the courts
for its own purposes. This suggests that Congress should be permitted to piggyback
on a suit brought by a proper plaintiff. However, in Chadha, the plaintiffs and the
executive were aligned against Congress. In the case of a challenge to a signing state-
ment and any subsequent act of nonenforcement, the plaintiff is likely to be aligned
with Congress seeking enforcement of a statute, rather than with the executive branch
seeking to strike down a statute. Thus, the specific procedural posture that existed
in Chadha-and was central to the Court's intervention ruling-would not apply.'23
116 In Chadha, the INS agreed with Chadha that the statute was unconstitutional; however,
it was obliged to carry out the order of deportation until a court declared the statute uncon-
stitutional. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930.
"17 Id. at 939-40.
118 See Beermann, supra note 90, at 113.
" Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930 n.5.
120 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,829 (1997); cf. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72,84-85 (1987)
(White, J., concurring) ("It bears pointing out, however, that we have now acknowledged that
the New Jersey Legislature and its authorized representative have the authority to defend the
constitutionality of a statute attacked in federal court.... [W]e again leave for another day
the issue whether individual legislators have standing to intervene and defend legislation for
which they voted.").
121 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919.
122 Id. at 936.
123 There may be a justification for more freely allowing defendant-intervenors than
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Still, other Supreme Court cases indicate that as long as proper plaintiffs are
before the Court, legislators can intervene on either side of the case. The standing
of private plaintiffs explains legislator intervention in Bowsher v. Synar.24 There,
a group of legislators who voted against the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985
sued to challenge the Act's constitutionality.' 2 The Act gave the Comptroller General,
a legislative officer, the ability to make binding budgetary decisions to effectuate deficit
reduction, and it gave Congress the authority to remove the Comptroller General. 1
26
The plaintiffs successfully charged that the Act resulted in an unlawful aggrandize-
ment of executive power to the legislature. 127 The Court stated that it did not have
to determine whether the legislators had standing to bring the suit, because their co-
plaintiffs were a group of federal employee unions facing salary freezes under the
Act, and therefore, they clearly had Article ImI standing.22 The Attorney General
defended the statute along with several other intervenors, including the United States
Senate, the Speaker, the Bipartisan Leadership Group of the House of Representatives,
and individual members of Congress. 129 The Court did not address, and the issue
apparently was not raised, why these intervenors were allowed into the case; however,
these defendant-intervenors were riding the coattails of the Attorney General, who
has the authority to defend statutes against constitutional attack.
Similarly, in Buckley v. Valeo, a slate of congresspersons intervened on both sides
of the case, which involved a First Amendment challenge to campaign finance laws. 30
There, the plaintiffs included a U.S. Senator running for re-election, as well as various
political candidates, political parties, and public interest groups. 131 The defendants
included the Federal Election Commission (FEC) (the agency charged with enforcing
the law), the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, and the Secretary of the
U.S. Senate and the clerk of the House of Representatives in their official capacities
and as ex officio members of FEC. 32 The Court did not assess the standing of each
of these parties. Instead, it concluded that "at least some of the appellants ha[d] a
sufficient 'personal stake"' to present an Article III controversy. 13 3 The Court cited
plaintiff-intervenors because standing requirements apply only to plaintiffs. See infra notes
147-57 and accompanying text (discussing whether intervenors must meet Article I standing
requirements).
124 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
125 Id. at 719.
126 Id. at 717-20.
127 Id. at 722 ("The Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the
supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts.").
128 Id. at 721.
129 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1378-79 (D.D.C. 1986) (describing the
procedural posture of the case below and listing intervenors).
130 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
"3 Id. at 7-8.
13 Id. at 8.
133 Id. at 12.
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Coleman in support of the proposition that "[p]arty litigants with sufficient concrete
interests at stake may have standing to raise constitutional questions of separation
of powers with respect to an agency designated to adjudicate their rights."'" 4 In
Buckley, the intervening legislators were directly impacted by the campaign finance
laws as individuals, making it more akin to Powell than Raines--or any lawsuits that
would challenge a signing statement.
Despite the Court's relatively permissive attitude towards intervention, at least
one circuit court has expressed concerns about unlimited congressional piggybacking.
In Newdow v. United States Congress,'35 the Ninth Circuit held that the Senate could
not intervene to defend a school district policy and state law that required public
school students to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, which contains the words "one
nation under God."' 36 The court stated that although the Attorney General had stand-
ing to defend the Pledge of Allegiance, the Senate lacked separate standing to defend
its statutes and that standing was a prerequisite for intervention. 137 The court did,
however, allow the Senate to participate as amicus if it wished.'38
The Ninth Circuit's justifications for its restricted view of intervention appear
inapposite to signing statement challenges. The court stated that permitting the Senate
to defend all statutes as a "roving commission" might be constitutionally suspect as
trenching on executive branch prerogatives. 39 While the court was correct that
normally the Attorney General represents the interests of the United States, this is
impossible when the executive and legislative branches disagree over the scope of
their respective powers. As the court recognized, Chadha and Bowsher allowed
intervention in cases that directly "implicated the authority of Congress within our
scheme of government, and the scope and reach of its ability to allocate power among
the three branches."' 4 By contrast, Newdow involved a constitutional question impli-
cating individual rights, and thus, the need for independent Senate involvement was
arguably less.' 4
The court also reasoned that granting the Senate the right to intervene in every
lawsuit challenging a statute would force plaintiffs to have to fight not only the
United States, but also the Senate, the House of Representatives, and perhaps even
114 Id. at 117.
5 313 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2002).
136 The father of an elementary student attacked the school district policy and the Pledge
as violating the First Amendment, and the Ninth Circuit agreed. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 962 (2003). The Ninth Circuit decision was later reversed in Elk Grove
School District v. Newdow, when the Court held that the father lacked standing because he
lacked legal custody of his daughter. 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
' Newdow, 313 F.3d at 497. The Pledge of Allegiance is set forth in 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
138 Newdow, 313 F.3d at 496.
1' id. at 497-98.
140 Id. at 498.
141 id.
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the President. 4 2 In Newdow, there was no reason to think that the Attorney General
would fail to represent the interests of Congress because they were similarly aligned.
This would not be the case in a presidential signing statement challenge. 143 Finally,
the court explained that the Senate had suffered "no harm beyond frustration of a
general desire to see the law enforced as written."' 44 Here, the court was correct.
The statute allowing Senate intervention requires that the Senate have standing,
145
and this is a nearly impossible standard to meet under Raines. If the Senate wants
to have broader intervention rights, it should amend 2 U.S.C. § 288e to remove the
standing requirement.
However, it is important to note that the circuit courts are split, and the Supreme
Court has not decided, whether an intervening plaintiff has to establish standing inde-
pendently of the initiating plaintiff.'" Bowsher suggests that separate standing is not
required for intervenors, at least for Congress and members of Congress, but that case
did not expressly address the issue and was decided before Raines, when the Court
established a narrower view of legislator standing. On the one hand, some courts hold
that because intervenors have all the rights and responsibilities of other parties, they
should meet the same constitutional standards. 4 7 On the other hand, other courts hold
that Article I does not require everyone in a case to have standing as long as a case
is properly initiated and the court is therefore not issuing an advisory opinion on an
abstract matter. 1
48
142 Id. at500&n.5.
14' The Newdow court distinguished the Senate's role in Raines by stating that in that case
the Senate was content to appear as amicus. Id. at 499 n.3. However, individual legislators were
allowed to intervene in Bowsher v. Sunar, a point not addressed in Newdow. 478 U.S. 714,
721 (1986).
'4 Newdow, 313 F.3d at 498.
14' 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2000).
146 See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54,68-69 (1986) ("We need not decide today whether
a party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy not only the requirements of
Rule 24(a)(2), but also the requirements of Art. III."). The Diamond Court indicated that the
defendant-intervenor could have piggybacked on an appeal by a defendant with Article III
standing, even though the intervenor himself did not have standing to appeal. However, for
the defendant-intervenor to appeal on his own, he would need standing. Id. at 68.
For a summary of how each circuit has ruled on the issue, see Joan Steinman, Irregulars:
The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full-Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 411,427
(2005). See also Amy M. Gardner, Comment, An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion:
Standing Requirements for Rule 24 Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 693-97 (2002);
Juliet Johnson Karastelev, Note, On the Outside Seeking in: Must Intervenors Demonstrate
Standing to Join a Lawsuit?, 52 DuKE L.J. 455, 464-68 (2002).
147 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573,577-78 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1006 (1999); see also discussion infra note 155 and accompanying text.
148 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 832 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1158
(1999); see also discussion infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
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Interestingly, two of the leading cases in the circuit split involve legislators as
intervenors. In Ruiz v. Estelle, Texas state legislators moved to intervene in ongoing
litigation over state prison conditions.'49 A statute gave legislators the right to intervene
regardless of standing, and the Fifth Circuit held that the statute was constitutional. '15 0
The court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 presumes that there is ajusti-
ciable case or controversy before the court.' 5' Thus, the court has proper jurisdiction
over the matter before the intervenor becomes involved.1 52 "Once a valid Article III
case-or-controversy is present, the court' s jurisdiction vests. The presence of additional
parties, although they alone could independently not satisfy Article 11's requirements,
does not of itself destroy jurisdiction already established."' ' 53
By contrast, in Planned Parenthood v. Ehlmann, the Eighth Circuit denied state
legislators the right to intervene to defend a statute excluding Planned Parenthood from
obtaining state funds.'54 The court applied the Eighth Circuit rule that intervenors must
have standing to intervene and then reasoned that the legislators lacked standing
because their votes were not nullified. 5 5 For its part, the D.C. Circuit, which is most
likely to hear challenges to signing statements and/or executive nonenforcement,
appears to require standing for intervenors, although the relevant cases deal with per-
missive intervention rather than intervention as of right." 6 Thus, intervention is not
a certain path for Congress to join litigation over presidential signing statements.
The Supreme Court has been exacting with its standing requirements for legis-
lators, while being more relaxed on intervention issues. This differential treatment is
justifiable. The separation of powers concerns that underlie Raines are not implicated
when legislators seek to intervene in a pre-existing lawsuit. In such cases, there is
less risk that the judiciary will lose its legitimacy by throwing itself into the political
fray, less risk that the dispute will be abstract, and less risk that the judiciary will end
up involved in "amorphous general supervision of the operations of government."'57
149 Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 816.
150 Id. at 828-33.
151 Id. at 832.
152 Id.
153 Id.
14 137 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 1998). The court relied on a prior case, Mausolfv. Babbitt, which
held: "In our view, an Article III case or controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack
standing, is-put bluntly-no longer an Article III case or controversy. An Article HI case or
controversy is one where all parties have standing, and a would-be intervenor, because he seeks
to participate as a party, must have standing as well." 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996).
... Ehlmann, 137 F.2d at 577.
156 See Jones v. Prince George's County, Md., 348 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Rio
Grande Pipeline Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 178 F.3d 533,537 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
"' Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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B. Amicus
The uncertainty over the scope of legislator intervention leaves the amicus option
as the only surefire way for Congress to insert its voice into litigation over presidential
signing statements. Indeed, after Raines, when the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New York, the Senate
appeared as amicus to support the United States in favor of the Act, as did individual
congresspersons, while other individual congresspersons submitted amicus briefs
arguing against the Act. 158
Amici are permitted at all levels of federal court litigation, from the district courts
to the circuit courts to the Supreme Court. I5 9 The role of the amicus is as "'friend
of the court'-someone who is not a party to the litigation but who believes that the
court's decision may affect its interests." ' 6° Even when a party has able legal counsel,
an amicus may provide important assistance to the court by providing background
information or particular expertise.' 61 In addition, amicus can "argue points deemed
too far-reaching for emphasis by a party intent on winning a particular case.... [or]
explain the impact a potential holding might have on an industry or other group.' 62
The government generally has greater rights to participate as amicus than private
parties. 163 For instance, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29, the United
States or its officer or agency may file an amicus curiae brief without the consent of
the parties or leave of court.164 By contrast, non-governmental entities need either of
these forms of permission to obtain amicus status. 61 Unlike an intervenor, an amicus
does not gain the same rights as the parties."6 For instance, at the appellate level, an
amicus needs the court's permission to participate in oral argument or to file a reply
brief. 167 Moreover, amicus cannot introduce new issues into the case or seek further
review by the Supreme Court. 168 Nevertheless, at the district court level, some judges
have permitted governmental amicus to introduce evidence and examine witnesses,
158 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,420 (1998).
1 See Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party
Begin After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 1243, 1256 (1992).
160 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 184 (rev. ed. 2002).
161 Luther T. Munford, When Does the Curiae Need an Amicus?, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
279, 281 (1999).
162 Id.
163 See Lowman, supra note 160, at 1261.
164 FED. R. APP. P. 29.
165 Id. ("Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief states
that all parties have consented to its filing.").
166 16AWRIGHTETAL., supra note 19, at § 3975.1 ("The amicus curiae, in short, does not
become a party to the appeal. It has no rights other than the conditional right to file 'a brief in
accordance with Rule 29.").
167 Id.
168 Id. § 3975.1 n.3.
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conduct discovery, seek injunctions, or petition for appeal.' 69 This enhanced level
of governmental amicus participation usually arises in cases involving structural
constitutional questions. 7 °
Although most judges freely grant amicus status, Judge Posner has been active in
campaigning against amicus briefs, stating that they are typically duplicative of one
side's briefs, drive up litigation costs, and insert interest group politics into the appel-
late process. 7' Accordingly, he would limit amicus briefs to situations in which
a party is not represented competently or is not represented at all,
when the anicus has an interest in some other case that may be
affected by the decision in the present case (though not enough
affected to entitle the amicus to intervene and become a party in
the present case), or when the amicus has unique information or
perspective that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers
for the parties are able to provide.
172
His reasoning extends to legislators; he denied amicus status to the Speaker of the
Illinois House of Representatives and the President of the Illinois Senate in a case in-
volving the constitutionality of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, arguing that an appeal
should "not resemble a congressional hearing., 173 Although Judge Posner's views
have spurred a lively debate, his opinion is the minority view.
174
169 See Lowman, supra note 160, at nn. 116-20. There is no specific rule allowing for
amicus participation at the district court level, but it is widely recognized that district courts
have broad discretion to appoint anicus. See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, 788 F. Supp. 196,
198 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 980 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Gotti, 755 F.
Supp. 1157, 1158-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Louisiana, 751 F. Supp. 608, 620
(E.D. La. 1990); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Bellefonte Borough, 718 F. Supp. 431,434 (M.D.
Pa. 1989) (citing Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982)); Yip v. Pagano, 606
F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D.N.J. 1985), affd, 782 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1141 (1986). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that amicus are less appropriate at the trial
court level than the appellate level because issues of fact predominate. Yip, 606 F. Supp. at
1568; accord News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 700 F. Supp. 30,32 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Donovan
v. Gillmor, 535 F. Supp. 154, 159 (N.D. Ohio 1982), appeal dismissed, 708 F.2d 723 (6th Cir.
1982); Leigh v. Engle, 535 F. Supp. 418, 422 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
170 See Lowman, supra note 160, at 1264-65.
171 See Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating
that amicus briefs should be "friend of the court, not friend of a party"); Ryan v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997).
172 Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063.
17' Voices for Choices, 339 F.3d. at 545.
174 See 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, at § 3975; Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends
of the Court or Nuisances?, 33 LmG. 5, 5 (2006). Justice Samuel Alito published an opinion
when he was on the Court of Appeals contesting Judge Posner's claims, stating:
[A] restrictive practice regarding motions for leave to file seems to be
an unpromising strategy for lightening a court's work load. For one
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Thus, despite standing and intervention hurdles, amicus remains a viable option
for Congress to insert its voice into lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of
statutes. Moreover, legislators may gain even more participatory rights than other
amici. Thus, concerns over legislative standing may be overwrought. However, the
amicus option hinges on there being a proper party to bring a case in the first place,
as well as ajusticiable claim that can proceed to the merits. Accordingly, the next Part
considers whether President Bush's signing statements are likely to be involved in a
case that is heard on the merits.
111. PRESIDENTIAL NON-ENFORCEMENT
Presidential signing statements are not justiciable because they are not ripe.
However, executive decisions to refuse to enforce a statute in line with a signing
statement may be justiciable if a proper plaintiff can be found. Congress cannot bring
suit on its own and may not even be able to intervene in a suit brought by a plaintiff
with standing. At a minimum, however, Congress can play a role in litigation over
presidential non-enforcement as an amicus. Still, there needs to be a proper plaintiff.
This Part looks at the actual instances of non-enforcement identified by the GAO to
see whether they could engender litigation. In addition, this Part looks at three high-
profile presidential signing statements that threaten non-enforcement to see whether
a private plaintiff could sue over actual non-enforcement and have the case proceed to
the merits. For both the actual and threatened acts of non-enforcement, thejusticiability
barriers are significant.
A. Actual Acts of Executive Non-enforcement
The GAO identified six statutory provisions in 2006 appropriations legislation
that the executive branch failed to carry out.175 The executive branch refused to en-
force laws that required the following actions: (1) congressional approval before the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) incurred certain administrative ex-
penses; (2) congressional approval before the Department of Agriculture transferred
enumerated funds; (3) submission of a FEMA proposal and expenditure plan for
housing; (4) anticipated budget expenditures from the Department of Defense (DOD)
thing, the time required for skeptical scrutiny of proposed amicus briefs
may equal, if not exceed, the time that would have been needed to study
the briefs at the merits stage if leave had been granted. In addition,
because private amicus briefs are not submitted in the vast majority of
court of appeals cases, and because poor quality briefs are usually easy
to spot, unhelpful amicus briefs surely do not claim more than a very
small part of a court's time.
Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 2002).
"' GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
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for fiscal year 2007 spending in Iraq; (5) DOD responses within twenty-one days to
questions posed by the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Quality of Life
and Veterans Affairs, House Committee on Appropriations; and (6) relocation of border
checkpoints by Customs and Border Patrol every seven days in the Tucson sector. 76
We already know that legislators probably lack standing to compel the judiciary
to adjudicate this tug-of-war between the executive and legislative branches.'7 It
is also hard to identify an obvious private plaintiff that would have standing to
challenge these particular executive acts of non-enforcement. The statutory provisions
identified by the GAO do not appear to impact discrete, individual interests.'78 Nor do
they require action or inaction on the part of any private party. Rather, they deal with
congressional oversight of the internal operations of government agencies and/or
prescribe how agencies should achieve statutory objectives.
Certainly, there may be people who are outraged by the executive branch's failure
to carry out clear statutory commands. For instance, someone concerned about illegal
immigration may be fuming that the Tucson area border checkpoints were not relo-
cated every seven days in order to better screen entry of aliens into the United States.
Or, a resident of a coastal area concerned about possible hurricane damage in the
future may be furious that FEMA is refusing to "submit [for approval] a proposal and
expenditure plan for housing" to Congress. 7 9 However, the Supreme Court has held
that standing is not established "when the asserted harm is a 'generalized grievance'
shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens."'180 Although
widespread injuries can be justiciable, each individual injury must be concrete, 8' and
frustration over an executive who fails to carry out congressional wishes about agency
operations is not a concrete injury.
This is why taxpayers generally do not have standing. For instance, in United
States v. Richardson, a taxpayer claimed that statutes protecting the secrecy of the CIA
budget violated the constitutional requirement for a regular statement and account of
public funds.'82 The Court held that he lacked standing because "he has not alleged
that, as a taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular concrete injury as a
result of the operation of this statute.'' 183 Instead, the plaintiff had only "generalized
176 Id.
177 See supra Part I.B.
178 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
17 Id. In addition to possible standing problems related to a speculative, future injury, this
hypothetical plaintiff would be hard-pressed to demonstrate that a properly enforced pilot
housing program would redress the future injury or that the lack of the pilot housing program
would cause a future injury.
180 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
18' Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
182 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
183 Id. at 177.
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grievances about the conduct of government."' 4 The Court acknowledged the pos-
sibility that "if respondent is not permitted to litigate this issue, no one can do so,"
but it concluded that "the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process."' 85
The Court has recognized taxpayer standing only where the plaintiff challenges
government expenditures as violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. 8 6 However, even this narrow exception to the bar against taxpayer standing has
been significantly restricted. Recently, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
the Court refused to find taxpayer standing in claims against the executive branch,
even when the plaintiffs alleged an Establishment Clause violation.8 7 In Hein, a public
interest organization claimed that conferences held pursuant to President Bush's
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program violated the Establishment Clause
because, among other things, President Bush and other high-ranking governmental
officials gave speeches that used "religious imagery" and praised the efficacy of faith-
based programs in delivering social services."' The Court rejected the plaintiffs'
assertion that they had taxpayer standing, stating, "In light of the size of the federal
budget, it is a complete fiction to argue that an unconstitutional federal expenditure
causes an individual federal taxpayer any measurable economic harm."' 89 To the
contrary, the Court stated, "if every federal taxpayer could sue to challenge any
i84 Id. at 173 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968)).
185 Id. at 179; see also Schlesingner v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974) (holding that plaintiffs did not have standing to enjoin members of Congress from
serving in the military reserves). The Supreme Court has held that the ban on generalized
grievances is a constitutional requirement and not simply a prudential limitation. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (2002). This means that even where Congress
statutorily grants standing to all citizens, such a statute may violate Article 11. Id. at 572-73;
cf. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (stating that there is no per se ban
on generalized grievances). Regardless, the statutes identified by the GAO as not being
enforced do not contain citizen suit provisions.
116 Flast, 392 U.S. at 83 (upholding taxpayer's standing to challenge federal subsidies to
parochial schools as violating the Establishment Clause). In Akins, the Court held that a statu-
tory right to information which is then denied, can give rise to standing even though harm
is widespread. Akins, 524 U.S. at 11. In such a case, unlike Richardson, "there is a statute
which... does seek to protect individuals.., from the kind of harm they say they have
suffered, i.e., failing to receive particular information about campaign-related activities." Id.
at 22. By contrast, the statutes the GAO identified as not executed do not contain underlying
rights flowing to citizens.
187 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
18' Id. at 2559. The President's Faith-Based and Community Initiatives program seeks to
expand funding to faith-based organizations to deliver social services and was created by
executive order. For a detailed discussion of the program, see Michele Estrin Gilman, If at
First You Don't Succeed, Sign an Executive Order: President Bush and the Expansion of
Charitable Choice, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1103, 1110-22 (2007).
89 Id. at 2559.
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Government expenditure, the federal courts would cease to function as courts of law
and would be cast in the role of general complaint bureaus."'"
The Court distinguished Flast on the grounds that the plaintiffs in Hein were not
challenging congressional action, but rather executive action. 9' Although the dis-
tinction seems to lack constitutional significance, the Court declined to extend
Flast to discretionary executive branch expenditures. The Court was concerned that
a contrary rule "would enlist the federal courts to superintend, at the behest of any
federal taxpayer, the speeches, statements, and myriad daily activities of the President,
his staff, and other Executive Branch officials."' 93 This would turn the courts into
"virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action,"
a result at odds with core separation of powers principles. 94
To be sure, the acts of non-enforcement identified by the GAO are different from
the executive acts at issue in Hein. In Hein, the executive branch was exercising its dis-
cretion in spending general appropriations funds. 95 By contrast, the non-enforcement
decisions identified by the GAO are in direct violation of unambiguous statutory com-
mands. For this reason, the separation of powers concerns are somewhat attenuated,
because the judiciary would not be second-guessing executive branch discretionary
decisions. Yet the Court may be wary of trying to determine whether an act of non-
enforcement is deliberate or simply an oversight or mistake. In any event, private
plaintiffs challenging those acts of non-enforcement would be hard-pressed to allege
concrete, individualized harm. It seems they would be suing as taxpayers, and thus,
their claims would not be cognizable. 196 Moreover, even if a private party could allege
a concrete injury, the litigation would be about the agency's nonenforcement. The
litigation would not be about the propriety of signing statements. Given the steps
between issuance of a presidential signing statement and an agency decision not to
enforce,'97 it would be very tough for a plaintiff to show that any injury was caused
by a presidential signing statement or redressable by an injunction banning presidential
signing statements.
'90 Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2559.
191 Id.
192 See id. at 2579-80 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2584 (Souter, J., dissenting).
'9' Id. at 2570 (majority opinion).
"9 Id. (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760 (1984)).
'9' See id.
196 Even if someone could identify an individualized harm caused executive be nonenforce-
ment that was traceable to the signing statement and redressable by a court ruling, the plaintiff
would have to establish that he is within the zone of interests protected by the statute. Ass'n
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). That is, the plaintiff would
have to establish that he is within the group the statute was designed to protect. The statutes
identified by the GAO were not enacted to benefit or regulate specific groups; they are de-
signed to improve the internal workings of government. Thus, the zone of interests test would
be difficult to satisfy.
197 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
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B. Threatened Acts of Non-enforcement
The acts of non-enforcement identified by the GAO are troubling to many
members of Congress and commentators, particularly DOD's refusal to provide a
budget for the ongoing war in Iraq.'98 However, most of the statutory provisions
identified by the GAO deal with the inner workings of government and do not impact
individual rights. Moreover, some agencies complied with the provisions shortly after
the required deadlines, or complied with them in part, thus alleviating part of the im-
pact of the agencies' failure to execute exactly as written.99 Other presidential signing
statements not within the GAO' s study have triggered intense scrutiny, interest, and
protest-as this very symposium reveals. Thus, this Section examines three of the
President's more controversial signing statements to see whether private plaintiffs
would have standing to challenge them and thereby provide Congress with a means for
having the courts address legislative concerns. These three signing statements involve
the President's objections to a statute requiring that the administrator of FEMA have
relevant experience, the McCain Amendment's ban on torture of detainees, and a
statute directing the President to take certain foreign policy steps with regard to Sudan.
1. Appointments
The Statute:
Administrator. (1) In general. The [Federal Emergency Manage-
ment] Administrator shall be appointed by the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. (2) Qualifications. The
Administrator shall be appointed from among individuals who
have-(A) a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency
management and homeland security; and (B) not less than 5 years
of executive leadership and management experience in the public
or private sector.2°
The Signing Statement:
Section 503(c)(2) vests in the President authority to appoint the
Administrator, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
but purports to limit the qualifications of the pool of persons
198 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, U.S. Agencies Disobey 6 Laws that President Challenged,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 19, 2007, at Al (discussing reactions to the GAO Report); Jonathan
Weisman, 'Signing Statements'Study Finds Administration Has Ignored Laws, WASH. POST,
June 19, 2007, at A4 (same).
199 See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 10.
200 Homeland Security Act of 2007, 6 U.S.C.A. § 313(c) (West Supp. 2007).
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from whom the President may select the appointee in a manner
that rules out a large portion of those persons best qualified by
experience and knowledge to fill the office. The executive branch
shall construe section 503(c)(2) in a manner consistent with the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 0 l
This statute was enacted in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, after the head of
FEMA, Michael Brown, was widely criticized for incompetence and ridiculed for his
lack of experience. 2 Congress sought to ensure that future FEMA administrators
possessed relevant backgrounds. President Bush objected to the limitation on his
powers under the Appointments Clause, which grants the President the authority to
appoint officers of the United States with the advice and consent of the Senate.2 3
It is difficult to conjure any scenario under which this signing statement, or
executive action taken in line with it, would be justiciable. To begin with, Congress
is not injured because the Senate retains its advice and consent role. If the President
appoints an individual who does meet the congressionally mandated requirements,
the Senate can avoid its past mistakes and refuse to confirm that nominee. If the Senate
goes ahead and confirms a FEMA administrator who does not fulfill the statutory
requirements, a private party could possibly challenge the authority of the FEMA
administrator by contending that he was not appointed in compliance with the statute.
However, that would not be an Appointments Clause challenge. Perhaps the private
party would be a citizen or local government official in a disaster area who was con-
cerned about recovery efforts. In such a situation, the private party would want the
statute to be enforced-he or she would not want to have the statute stricken as an un-
constitutional Appointments Clause violation. In other words, the lawsuit would not
be challenging the President or his signing statement.
Conversely, a litigant unhappy with the FEMA administrator might challenge his
authority by claiming that the qualification requirement impinges on the President's
prerogatives. Yet the D.C. Circuit has consistently rebuffed Appointments Clause
challenges to agency composition on standing grounds, requiring plaintiffs to show not
only that they are directly regulated parties, but also that the alleged harm is directly
traceable to the agency's decisions and that the appointments restriction actually im-
pacted the President's choice. °4 Although this caselaw is interesting, it is probably
201 Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007,
42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1742, 1742-43 (Oct. 4, 2006).
202 See Peter Baker, FEMA Director Replaced as Head ofRelief Effort, WASH. POST, Sept.
10, 2005, at Al.
203 U.S. CONST. art. Hl, § 2. As a substantive matter, the congressional limitation on the
President's appointment power is probably constitutional. See Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 129 (1926) (stating that Congress may impose "reasonable and relevant qualifications
and rules of eligibility of appointees").
204 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (rejecting a challenge to the composition of the Federal Election Commission in which
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beside the point. After the Michael Brown debacle, the President appointed R. David
Paulison, the then-acting FEMA administrator and a career firefighter with thirty-
five years of experience in emergency management.2 ' There is no indication that
the statute made a bit of difference to the President's choice; for political reasons he
clearly had to appoint a qualified individual after Katrina. As with many of the signing
statements, this one is more bluster than bite. The President is using signing statements
as one of many tools to reinforce his overarching theories about the nature of executive
power,2°6 but he does not necessarily object to the substantive goal of the statutes at
issue, or even intend to follow through on his objections. This further demonstrates
why signing statements are not ripe. In many cases, such as this one, the President
implements the statute as Congress clearly intended.
2. War Powers/Anti-Torture
Statute:
(a) In General.-No individual in the custody or under the
physical control of the United States Government, regardless of
nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment.2 7
Signing Statement:
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the
Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the con-
stitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary exec-
utive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with
the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will
assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the
President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people
from further terrorist attacks.0 8
plaintiff alleged that the requirement that no more than three members belong to the same
political party is unconstitutional); Comm. for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (rejecting a challenge to the composition of the
Federal Reserve System).
205 See Eric Lipton, Nominations Made for Top Post at FEMA and Three Other Slots,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at A20.
206 Throughout his presidency, George W. Bush has invoked a broad view of executive
power, of which signing statements are just one tool. See generally Allen, supra note 31.
207 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003(a), 119 Stat. 2680,2739
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000dd (West Supp. 2007)).
208 Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006,
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This signing statement is probably the most controversial of them all. Following
revelations about detainee abuse by the American military at Abu Ghraib prison during
the Iraq War, Congress passed this provision, known as the McCain Amendment,
to prohibit torture. 29 The President responded by objecting to the torture ban's
limitations on his powers to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander
in Chief.21° Clearly, there are individuals who would be physically and mentally in-
jured if the military defies the McCain Amendment and engages in torture. However,
this does not mean that these alleged torture victims would be able to use American
courts to recover for their injuries and, in so doing, challenge the administration's
policies and views of executive power.
The law in this area is complicated and in flux, but recent cases demonstrate the
barriers to torture claims by foreign nationals. The first problem is that there is no stat-
ute, including the McCain Amendment, expressly creating a private right of action for
damages caused by torture that is inflicted by United States employees.21' The second
problem is that rights secured by the Constitution do not apply to foreign citizens. 2
Furthermore, even if a plaintiff can overcome these barriers, he must still contend with
sovereign and official immunity doctrines that bar torture claims against the United
States and its employees.213
These obstacles are illustrated by the case In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees
Litigation.1 4 There, nine foreign plaintiffs claimed that they were innocent civilians
41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005).
209 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
210 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. The story does not end with the signing
statement. To the contrary, all three branches of government have been engaged in defining
the permissible boundaries of the President's war powers with regard to detainees. See David
Cole, The Poverty of Posner's Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11, 59 STAN.
L. REv. 1735, 1750-51 (2007); Michael Greenberger, You Ain't Seen Nothin' Yet: The
Inevitable Post-Hamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches,
66 MD. L. REV. 805, 811-15 (2007); Jamie Mayerfeld, Playing by Our Own Rules: How U.S.
Marginalization of International Human Rights Law Led to Torture, 20 HARv. HUM. RTS.
J. 89, 99-110 (2007) (discussing developments preceding and following enactment of McCain
Amendment).
211 See Cole, supra note 210, at 1749 ("[T]he McCain Amendment .... included no
mechanism for enforcement of violations, and expressly barred prisoners in the war on terror
from filing habeas corpus petitions to challenge such abuse."); Mayerfeld, supra note 210,
at 116 ("[M]any of the legal measures needed to prevent torture are already present in inter-
national law. The United States, however, has blocked the incorporation of several of these
measures into its domestic legal system."); Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 719-20 (2006) ("[T]he availability of civil remedies for U.S. torture
under current law is razor-thin.... Current law must change in order for the United States to
keep its promise not to torture people.").
212 See Seamon, supra note 211, at 776.
213 Id. at 722-23.
214 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007).
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who were tortured and abused while detained by the United States military at various
locations in Iraq and Afghanistan before they were released without being charged
with any crimes .21 They sued the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld,
as well as several high-ranking military officials alleging violations of the Fifth and
Eighth Amendments to the Constitution and international law.216 The court held that
rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution do not extend to foreign citizens
detained by the military in foreign countries, and further, that special factors coun-
seled hesitation in recognizing such constitutional claims under the Bivens doctrine.2 7
Given the constitutional commitment of military and foreign affairs to the political
branches, the court deemed it best to leave it to Congress to determine "whether a
damages remedy should be available under the circumstances presented here. '218 In
a footnote, the court noted that Congress had twice legislated about detainee treatment
but did not create a private cause of action in either instance.29 Further, the court stated
that even if a Bivens action could be recognized, "government officials are afforded
qualified immunity, which shields them from 'liability for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.' 220 The court determined that at the
time of the alleged abuse, there was no clear constitutional violation.22' The court also
held that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity under the Westfall Act,
which affords federal employees absolute immunity from tort liability for negligent
or wrongful acts or omissions while acting within the scope of their employment.
222
Since the court held that defendants were acting within the scope of their employment,
the lawsuit was converted to one against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA).223
The court did not reach the claims against the United States under the FTCA,
which is a waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity for torts committed by
employees of the United States. 224 However, the FTCA contains numerous excep-
tions that would likely bar a lawsuit by a foreign national against the United States
for torture, including exceptions for claims arising out of combatant activities of the
military, claims arising in foreign countries, and intentional torts.2 2 5 In short, the
215 Id. at 88.
216 Id. at 90-91.
217 Id. at 95.
218 Id. at 107.
219 Id. at 107 n.23.
220 Id. at 108 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
221 Id. at 109.
222 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2000).
223 Id.
224 Id. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671-2680.
225 See Seamon, supra note 211, at 732-53 (discussing the FTCA exceptions in the context
of torture claims). The Alien Tort Claims Act also fails to provide a clear avenue for relief
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resounding message that comes from courts and scholars who have examined the
issue is that Congress could create a remedy for torture committed by the United
States, but that it needs to do so expressly.22 6 Thus far, it has not. In turn, this makes
it nearly impossible for Congress to use the courts as a forum for articulating
congressional views about torture. Of course, Congress has the power to provide
private remedies for torture if it chooses to give teeth to its prohibitions.
The issue of detainee torture could arise in other litigation contexts, such as a
criminal trial of a soldier charged with torture or, conversely, a soldier refusing to carry
out orders. As the prior discussion suggests, however, the law banning and defining
torture is complex and involves a mix of many domestic and foreign statutes, treaties,
covenants, conventions, and international customary law.227 The President's signing
statement is but one piece of a much larger mosaic that involves all three branches of
government in a dialogue about the conduct of war. As torture claims arise in litigation,
the courts consider whether the alleged facts violate specific, actionable laws. While
a lawsuit might raise the issue of the scope of the President's Commander-in-Chief
powers, it would not raise the issue of whether the President should have vetoed the
McCain Amendment if he disagreed with it. In short, the President's conception of
executive power, as expressed in the signing statement, might someday be litigated,
but the propriety of the signing statement as a vehicle for expressing those views
likely would not.228
3. Foreign Policy/Sudan Peace Act
Statute:
(A) The President shall make a determination and certify in writing
to the appropriate congressional committees within 6 months after
the date of enactment of this Act [Oct. 21, 2002], and each 6
months thereafter, that the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and
that negotiations should continue. (B) If... the President deter-
mines... that the Government of Sudan has not engaged in good
due to sovereign immunity and the exclusivity provisions of the FTCA. See id. at 761-73; cf
Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1162-63
(2006) (arguing that the Alien Tort Claims Act is available for torture claims).
226 See supra note 210.
227 See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,
105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681, 1688 (2005) (describing the various sources of the prohibition of
torture).
228 The signing statement could perhaps be utilized as a form of legislative history. See
generally William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A Critique,
66 IND. L.J. 699, 701 (1991).
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faith negotiations ... then the President, after consultation with
the Congress, shall implement the [following] measures .... (A)
shall, through the Secretary of the Treasury, instruct the United
States executive directors to each international financial institution
to continue to vote against and actively oppose any extension by
the respective institution of any loan, credit, or guarantee to the
Government of Sudan; (B) should consider downgrading or
suspending diplomatic relations between the United States and
the Government of Sudan; (C) shall take all necessary and ap-
propriate steps, including through multilateral efforts, to deny
the Government of Sudan access to oil revenues to ensure that
the Government of Sudan neither directly nor indirectly utilizes
any oil revenues to purchase or acquire military equipment or to
finance any military activities; and (D) shall seek a United Nations
Security Council Resolution to impose an arms embargo on the
Government of Sudan.229
Signing Statement:
Section 6(b) of the Act purports to direct or burden the conduct
of negotiations by the executive branch with foreign governments,
international financial institutions, and the United Nations Security
Council and purports to establish U.S. foreign policy objectives.
The executive branch shall construe these provisions as advisory
because such provisions, if construed as mandatory, would imper-
missibly interfere with the President's exercise of his constitutional
authorities to conduct the Nation's foreign affairs, participate in
international negotiations, and supervise the unitary executive
branch.23°
This is one of several statutes directing the President to take certain steps in con-
ducting the foreign policy of the United States to which the President has objected in
a signing statement. 3 The Sudan Peace Act deals with the devastating and intractable
229 Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245, § 6(b)(l)-(2), 116 Stat. 1504, 1507-08 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. II 2002)).
230 Statement on Signing the Sudan Peace Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1819 (Oct.
21, 2002).
231 See also Statement on Signing the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2673 (Oct. 28, 2004); Statement on
Signing the Vision 100-Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1795 (Dec. 12, 2003); Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1658 (Sept. 30, 2002); Statement on Signing
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genocide and civil war in Sudan.232 In addition to the enforcement mechanisms set
forth above, the Act declares that the government of Sudan is engaged in genocide,
seeks "to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan," and allocates
$300 million over a three-year period "for assistance" in areas of Sudan outside of
government control.233 The President does not object to the statutory goals, however,
according to his signing statement, he does not believe that Congress can tell him how
to carry out foreign policy.
34
The Supreme Court has never definitively demarcated the respective powers of
Congress and the President in foreign affairs. As Jide Nzelibe summarizes:
On one side of the debate, pro-President scholars stress the
importance of strength and flexibility in an executive that is not
fettered in his foreign-policy goals by parochial legislators. On
the other side of the debate, pro-Congress scholars argue that a
legislative check on the President's foreign-policy actions encour-
ages democratic accountability and effective scrutiny.235
Further, scholars dispute whether this question--the respective foreign policy powers
of the President and Congress-is even judicially reviewable.236
the Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1014
(June 14, 2002); Statement on Signing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 822 (May 14, 2002).
232 For more information on the conflict in Sudan and the impact of the Sudan Peace Act
on the conflict, see TED DAGNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE SUDAN
PEACE PROCESS (2003), available at http://ecosonline.org/back/pdf.reports/2003/sudanreport
2003.pdf.
233 Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No. 107-245, §§ 2(10), 4, 6(b)(2). 116 Stat. 1504, 1508
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. H 2002)).
234 For a discussion of whether Congress has the authority to direct the President to take
coercive diplomatic actions against a foreign government, see generally J. Andrew Kent,
Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of
Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843 (2007) (arguing that Congress has the authority to take such
actions under the Law of Nations Clause of the Constitution).
235 Jide Nzelibe,A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution, 91 IOWAL. REv. 993,
996 (2006). As to the merits of the President's assertion, compare Van Alstine, supra note 31,
at 314 (arguing that the "Constitution does not vest in the president a general, independent
lawmaking power in foreign affairs"), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey,
The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 355-56 (2001) ("Outside its
specific foreign affairs powers such as declaring war or regulating commerce, and laws nec-
essary and proper to such powers, Congress may legislate only to carry into execution the
President's foreign affairs powers.").
236 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1980 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS:
DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)).
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The Supreme Court is unlikely to resolve the debate anytime soon. Even assuming
there was a party who would have standing based on the President's refusal to carry
out the Sudan Peace Act,237 the Court historically has dodged similar tug-of-wars
between the branches over foreign policy. Relying on the political question doc-
trine, the Supreme Court has left certain areas of constitutional interpretation to the
politically accountable branches. In Baker v. Carr, the Court stated that a political
question arises when there is
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impos-
sibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multi-
farious pronouncements by various departments on one question.238
The boundaries of the political question doctrine are infamously hazy, and the criteria
for its application are confusing.239
Nevertheless, the doctrine is regularly used to deny judicial review to cases raising
foreign policy issues. The Court has held that the following are nonjusticiable
political questions: the determination of when war begins or ends, the recognition
of foreign governments, the determination of who represents a foreign state, the
ratification and interpretation of treaties, and the use of the President's War Powers. 240
237 Standing is extremely unlikely given the difficulties there would be in linking presidential
non-enforcement to the alleged injuries under the traceability and redressability prongs of the
standing doctrine.
238 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
239 On the continued vitality of the political question doctrine, see the collected essays in
THE POLrTICAL QUESTION DOCTRNE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 160
(Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2007).
240 See ERwIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.8 (3d ed. 2006). It is not clear the
extent to which Hamdan signals an end to judicial constraint in the area of foreign affairs and
war powers. See also Nancy Kassop, A Political Question By Any Other Name: Government
Strategy in the Enemy Combatant Cases ofHamdi and Padilla, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 239, at 127, 160
("At bottom, [the Hamdi decision] made crystal clear that, in matters of individual rights during
wartime, the president's policies were not immune from judicial review."); cf Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The "Enemy Combatant" Cases in Historical Context: The Inevitability of
Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1005, 1064(2007) ("Hamdan presents
the exceedingly rare situation in which the Court distorted its jurisdictional precedent to reach
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For instance, in Goldwater v. Carter,24' Senator Barry Goldwater challenged President
Carter's unilateral rescission of a treaty with Taiwan, contending that treaty rescission
required the approval of two-thirds of the Senate.24 2 The plurality held that the case
posed a political question because there were no constitutional standards governing
treaty rescission, and the dispute was between "coequal branches of our Government,
each of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests. '243 Likewise,
the Court may conclude that if Congress is upset with how the President is handling
foreign policy with Sudan, it has several measures at its disposal to express its dis-
approval, the most potent being the power of the purse. In any event, the evidence
suggests that the President has been complying with the reporting requirements of
the Sudan Peace Act, and further that the sanction requirements in the Act have not
been triggered.244 Accordingly, unlike the signing statement that accompanied the
McCain Amendment, this signing statement appears designed to protect the President's
prerogatives rather than to disagree with Congress over substantive goals and methods.
The courts may someday choose to resolve the competing conceptions of power over
foreign policy, but it will likely be in a case in which the President overtly flaunts
congressional commands.
CONCLUSION
Although some members of Congress are upset about President Bush's aggressive
use of presidential signing statements, it is unlikely congresspersons could use the
courts to challenge this presidential practice. Legislators usually lack standing to chal-
lenge executive branch decisions, and courts apply a variety ofjusticiability doctrines
to limit review of cases involving disputes between the executive and legislative
branches. When signing statements play a role in litigation, it is only as a possible
source of legislative history, and even this use is controversial. Still, members of
Congress may find value in proposing legislation to give them standing to challenge
signing statements or in filing lawsuits that ultimately get dismissed. Such actions
a controversial legal issue."); Jana Singer, Hamdan as an Assertion of Judicial Power, 66 MD.
L. REv. 759,763-464 (2007) ('The fact that the Court did not follow the cautious approach that
it has taken in previous foreign affairs disputes indicates that the Court not only wanted to
recalibrate the balance between Congress and the Executive, but also that the Court wanted
to establish itself as an important player in future national security disputes-at least where
those disputes involve claims of individual liberty.").
241 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
242 Id.
243 Id. at 1004.
244 See DAGNE, supra note 232, at 18-19; see also, e.g., Presidential Determination on the
Sudan Peace Act, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 665 (Apr. 21, 2004) (certifying that the
government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement have been negotiating
in good faith).
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send a message to the President that Congress is monitoring executive attempts at
aggrandizement and is willing to push back. However, if Congress wants to do more
than score points in the court of public opinion, it probably needs to flex its political
muscles to overcome executive non-enforcement.
The presidential practice of using signing statements is likely not justiciable.
However, simply because an injury is lacking for standing purposes does not mean
there is no harm. Standing doctrine is of no help when all citizens are harmed equally.
President Bush's signing statements are one of many tools he has used to articulate
a rigid view of a unitary executive. In this view, the President has spheres of authority
into which no other branch can intrude. Not surprisingly, in lieu of cooperation and
collaboration, President Bush has often bypassed Congress in establishing foreign
policy, national security, or domestic objectives. By sheer repetition, the President's
view of the unitary executive theory may become so entrenched that the rule of law
dissipates in favor of unchecked executive power. To be sure, the signing statements
add some transparency to the President's thought processes and allow Congress and
the public to monitor the executive branch. Suffice to say, we have been warned.
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